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Is Italy internationally responsible 
for the gross human rights violations 








It is widely known that many migrants coming from Sub-Saharan 
Africa or the Middle East try to reach the European shores through 
Libya. It is also widely known that, before being able to set sail, many 
of them are halted and detained for a long time in Libya, where they 
suffer from gross human rights violations. In Libya migrants die of 
thirst, hunger or illnesses, some are tortured or beaten to death while 
working as slaves, others are just casually murdered or simply disap-
pear. Rape and sexual assault are part of the migrants’ daily routine. 
Detained migrants are often auctioned if their families do not pay a 
ransom for their release. All this is documented not only by NGOs, 
journals, and newspapers but also by the International Organisation 
for Migration and some other institutional international bodies, such 
as the UN High Commissioners for Human Rights and for Refugees 
or the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC.1 
In the next pages, I will try to shed some light on the role that Italy 
plays in said situation. Basically, the aim is to address the question as to 
 
* Fixed-Term Assistant Professor in International Law, Department of Political and 
Social Sciences, University of Trieste. 
1 Three preliminary caveats apply. First, for reasons of fluency, I will use the term 
‘migrants’ to encompass economic migrants, asylum seekers and in general all foreigners 
who are in Libya and whose aim is to set sail from Libya and land on European shores. 
Second, most of the documents mentioned in the text are well-known and very easily 
accessible online at the relevant official websites. When necessary, these documents will 
be considered and quoted in the following footnotes. Third, the information provided 
in this paper has been lastly updated in December 2018.  
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whether Italy is somehow internationally responsible for the gross hu-
man rights violations inflicted on migrants in Libya, namely while mi-
grants are under Libyan jurisdiction. I will attempt to answer this ques-
tion bearing in mind above all the general frame of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (DARSIWA) 
adopted in 2001 by the UN International Law Commission (ILC).2 
The starting point of this paper will be the current Italian strategy to 
counter migration, founded on outsourcing border control to Libya. In 
the context of this strategy, while it is possible to assume the interna-
tional responsibility of Libya for the perpetration of gross human rights 
violations to the detriment of migrants therein halted and detained, the 
role of Italy seems ambiguous. On the one hand, Italy only has a ‘con-
tactless control’ of migration flows.3 It means that Italy does not directly 
commit any human rights violation.4 As a result, it may be difficult to 
 
2 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001). 
3 The expression ‘contactless control’ is employed by V Moreno-Lax and MG 
Giuffré, ‘The Rise of Consensual Containment: From “Contactless Control” to “Con-
tactless Responsibility” for Forced Migration Flows’, in S Juss (ed), Research Handbook 
on International Refugee Law (Edward Elgar forthcoming) available at 
<www.ssrn.com> 1-26. 
4 It seems difficult that, in this context, Italy is held responsible because of the 
extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR, unless the ECtHR offers a broader inter-
pretation of this legal concept. Indeed, that could happen in the coming months. In 
May 2018, a coalition consisting of NGOs and scholars filed an application concern-
ing the alleged Italian responsibility for the deaths of twenty asylum seekers off the 
coast of Libya and the refoulement of many others to Libya in November 2017. The 
Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre was somehow involved in the events. As 
an instance of strategic litigation, the aim of the application seems to have the ECtHR 
apply the Kebe precedent (Kebe and Others v Ukraine App no 12552/12 (ECtHR, 12 
January 2017), notwithstanding the clear differences between the two cases. In par-
ticular, the ECtHR is expected to state that Italy has the ‘jurisdiction to decide’ 
whenever the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre keeps in touch with the 
Libyan coast guard in the context of rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea and 
that Italy retains control over migrants also when it equips or trains the Libyan organs 
that concretely commit gross human rights violations against migrants. See F De Vit-
tor, ‘Responsabilità degli Stati e dell’Unione europea nella conclusione e 
nell’esecuzione di “accordi” per il controllo extraterritoriale della migrazione’ (2018) 
12 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 20-22; M Baumgärtel, ‘High Risk, High 
Reward: Taking the Question of Italy’s Involvement in Libyan “Pullback” Polices to 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2018) EJIL: Talk!. According to another 
view, in the context here under examination, the doctrine of positive obligations (as 
developed in the case-law of the ECtHR) could be a useful tool to address the direct 
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consider the possibility that Italy and Libya are both internationally re-
sponsible for the same wrongful acts or other circumstances of shared 
international responsibility.5 On the other hand, as observed hereinaf-
ter, it is a matter of fact that Italy renders its aid and assistance to the 
Libyan authorities that commit the abovementioned atrocities.  
Therefore, one might be under the impression that Italy is interna-
tionally responsible for complicity with Libya. In order to confirm this 
impression, I will focus on the norm on State responsibility for complicity 
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act of another State as 
codified in Article 16 DARSIWA. In particular, I will verify whether the 
elements defining State responsibility for complicity come into considera-
tion in the case here under discussion.  
As I will explain, it is very likely that the aid and assistance provided 
by Italy also facilitate Libya in maintaining the situation created as a re-
sult of the gross human rights violations against migrants. That fur-
thermore could entail the (at least implicit) recognition by Italy of that 
situation as lawful. Should that be the case, Italy would violate the obli-
gations codified in Article 41(2) DARSIWA weighing on all States in 
the event of serious breaches by a State of peremptory norms of general 







international responsibility of Italy in the ECHR system: see A Liguori, ‘The Exter-
nalization of Border Controls and the Responsibility of Outsourcing States under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2018) 101 Rivista di diritto internazionale 
4, 1228-1237. Be that as it may, it would not be an easy task for the ECtHR to find 
the direct responsibility of Italy by means of the doctrine of positive obligations re-
ferred to situations occurring exclusively in the Libyan territory, as those here de-
scribed.  
5 Art 47 DARSIWA concerns the case of a plurality of responsible States for the 
same internationally wrongful acts. See ML Padelletti, Pluralità di Stati nel fatto illecito 
internazionale (Giuffré 1990). This concept has been developed and updated through 
the new notion of ‘shared international responsibility’. On this notion, see the seminal 
book by A Nollkaemper, I Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of Shared Responsibility in In-
ternational Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art (CUP 2014).  
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2. Italy and the strategy of outsourcing border control to Libya to 
 counter migration flows in the central Mediterranean Sea 
 
As is well-known, since when Kaddafi’s regime collapsed in Libya, 
there has been a migration crisis in the Central Mediterranean Sea.6 Be-
cause of its geographical position, Italy is very often the first EU entry 
State for migrants coming from Libya. So, pursuant to the ‘Dublin III’ 
Regulation, Italy bears the heaviest legal and social burdens deriving 
from such a crisis.7 Meanwhile, Italy is also subject to political and 
‘emotional’ repercussions. Both big tragedies and local incidents con-
nected with migration gain great visibility in the everyday debate. As a 
consequence, the control of migration flows in the Central Mediterra-
nean Sea currently seems to have become the main political goal of Ita-
ly. 
To achieve this goal according to international law, Italy cannot in-
tercept migrants while they are on the high seas and push them back to 
their transit countries if, once there, they run the risk of suffering from 
gross human rights violations. As the ECtHR stated in its Hirsi judg-
ment, Italy has to abide by the international obligation of non-
refoulement whenever migrants are under its control, even on the high 
 
6 Before leaving for Europe, migrants usually converge around Libya not only to 
hopefully take advantage of the Libyan troubled political situation, but also for many 
other reasons, as explained in the report no 179 ‘How Libya’s Fezzan Became Europe’s 
New Border’ issued by the NGO International Crisis Group. 
7 The first EU Member State entered by a migrant shall examine the relevant appli-
cation for international protection pursuant to art 13 of Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 
‘Dublin III’. This provision clearly entails a structural imbalance among EU Member 
States whose borders coincide with the EU external borders and the other EU Member 
States. For in-depth studies of this subject, mostly developed with regard to art 80 
TFEU, concerning the solidarity principle among EU Member States in the migration 
field, see MI Papa, ‘Crisi dei rifugiati e principio di solidarietà ed equa ripartizione delle 
responsabilità tra gli Stati membri dell’UE’ (2016) 14 Costituzionalismo.it 286-324, and 
G Morgese, La solidarietà tra gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea in materia di immi-
grazione e asilo (Cacucci 2018). A recast of the ‘Dublin III’ Regulation is now under ex-
amination: see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible 
for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member 
States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast) COM/2016/0270 final 
(4 May 2016). The European Parliament expressed its position on 6 November 2017. If 
adopted, it would not include the rule of the ‘first entry State’. 
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seas.8 Moreover, Italy cannot close its harbours to vessels carrying mi-
grants saved from shipwrecks. Regardless of the current political propa-
ganda, Italy must respect its relevant international obligations.9 
Thus, since approximately 2014, Italy has been strengthening an al-
ternative strategy against migrants, consisting in outsourcing (or exter-
nalising) the control of Italian borders to Libya10. The result of this 
strategy is that the Libyan Government (and the many actors who hold 
local power in Libya and are also associated in this strategy)11 acts to 
stop migrants trying to set sail towards the European shores and to 
bring them into Libyan reception centres, mostly managed by the De-
partment to Counter Illegal Migration (DCIM) of the Libyan Ministry 
of Interior.12 In return, Italy sends military instructors to train the Liby-
 
8 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012).  
9 As known, since 1 June 2018, when the current Government took office, Italy has 
been preventing rescue vessels from entering Italian harbours and disembarking the mi-
grants that they have saved from shipwrecks. This situation contrasts with many interna-
tional obligations. For a list and an assessment of said international obligations, see P 
De Sena, F De Vittor, ‘La “minaccia” italiana di “bloccare” gli sbarchi di migranti e il 
diritto internazionale’ (2017) SIDI Blog, whose considerations can be applied to the 
current frame, although stemming from previous events. For different views, see M 
Fink, K Gombeer, ‘The Aquarius Incident: Navigating the Turbulent Waters of Inter-
national Law’ (2018) EJIL: Talk!, whose legal analysis of the well-known Aquarius inci-
dent could be referred also to the following similar cases. 
10 The Italian strategy of outsourcing border control is shaped on the Australian 
model. See interestingly F Mussi, N Feith Tan, ‘Comparing Cooperation on Migration 
Control. Italy-Libya and Australia-Indonesia’ (2015) 10 Irish YB Intl L 87-108. For a 
discussion on the origin, meaning and functioning of the Italian strategy of outsourcing 
border control, see G Pascale, ‘Esternalizzazione delle frontiere in chiave antimigratoria 
e responsabilità internazionale dell’Italia e dell’UE per complicità nelle gross violations 
commesse in Libia’ (2018) 13 Studi sull’integrazione europea 413-422, and the bibliog-
raphy therein. For a political and philosophical analysis, also see G Campesi, ‘Italy and 
the Militarization of Euro-Mediterranean Border Control Policies’ in E Borroughs, K 
Williams (eds), Contemporary Boat Migration. Data, Geopolitics and Discourses (Row-
man & Littlefield forthcoming) available at <www.academia.edu> 1-24.  
11 At present, as known, many militias dispute the control over the Libyan territo-
ries, while the official Government rules only over a small part of Tripolitania. See 
online the ‘Libya Country Profile’ of BBC or the ‘World Report 2018: Libya’ of Human 
Rights Watch. 
12 The Libyan reception centres have been instituted under Decree no 145/2012, 
Adopting the Organisational Structure and Powers of the Interior Ministry and the Organ-
isation of its Administrative Units, and confirmed with Decree no 386/2014, Establish-
ing the Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency. The Libyan legislation can be read in English at 
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an coast guard and border guard; gives assistance to complete the Liby-
an border control system; finances the Libyan reception centres and the 
training of the personnel thereof. In short, Italy has so far tried to elude 
any international responsibility, severing any direct ‘contact’ with mi-
gration flows coming from Libya. This strategy is consistent with EU mi-
gration policies.13 
The main instrument of the Italian strategy of outsourcing border 
control to Libya is the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).14 
This is a bilateral agreement, stipulated by Italy and Libya pursuant to a 
simplified procedure and entered into force at the moment of signing.15 
In brief, according to the MoU, Libya commits to turning itself into a 
gatekeeper to prevent migrants from leaving for Europe, while Italy un-
dertakes to support Libya to this end and to steer additional funds to 
Libya, mainly through the Italian Fund for Africa.16 
At Libya’s request, Italy has also deployed a support mission to the 
Libyan coast guard in charge of countering irregular migration and 
 
<www.security-legislation.ly>. The map of the Libyan reception centres is periodically 
updated by the International Organisation for Migration at its official website. 
13 Many studies deal with EU migration policies. See F Cherubini (ed), Le migra-
zioni in Europa. UE, Stati terzi e migration outsourcing (Bordeaux 2015), and V More-
no-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe. Extraterritorial Border Control and Refugee Rights 
under EU Law (OUP 2017). See also Human Rights Watch, ‘No Escape from Hell. EU 
Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya’ (21 January 2019). 
14 Memorandum d’intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto 
all’immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento 
della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, signed in 
Rome on 2 February 2017 by the Italian Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Presi-
dential Council of the Government of National Accord of Libya. The official text is 
available in Italian and Arabic at the online treaties archive (ATRIO) of the Italian Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. Many unofficial translations in English are available online. 
15 The MoU is an international agreement of both political and financial charac-
ter. As such, it should have been stipulated following the solemn procedure enshrined 
in art 80 of the Italian Constitution, namely with a parliamentary authorization to the 
presidential ratification. Since the Government did not involve the Parliament in the 
stipulation process, four members of the Camera dei Deputati complained of a con-
flict between the legislative and the executive powers before the Corte Costituzionale. 
The petition has recently been dismissed on procedural grounds. In particular, the 
Corte Costituzionale has underlined that the whole Camera dei deputati (not some of 
its members) should have filed the petition. See ordinanza no 163 (19 July 2018). 
16 The Italian Fund for Africa has been instituted by virtue of art 1(621), Legge no 
232/2016 (budget law 2017). It is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Italy un-
dertakes to steer funds to Libya also through the sponsorship of private investments. 
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human trafficking and smuggling at sea.17 Moreover, it is well-known 
that the current Italian Minister of Interior is strongly ‘fighting’ all 
NGOs seeking to operate in the Central Mediterranean Sea and has 
not repudiated the Code of Conduct (adopted under the aegis of his 
predecessor) that indirectly limits interventions of NGO vessels in the 
same area: it seems that the aim is to foster the role of the Libyan coast 
guard in situations of migrants shipwrecking in order to let Italy es-
cape any contact with migrants.18 Furthermore, Italy takes a part in 
some EU operations to counter human trafficking and smuggling in 
the Mediterranean Sea.19 Since Italy started strengthening its strategy 
of outsourcing border control to Libya, the number of migrants ar-





17 See the Stenographic Records of the sessions of the Camera dei Deputati (at 48) 
and of the Senato della Repubblica (at 71), both held on 2 August 2017, concerning the 
debate on the deployment of the support mission to the Libyan coast guard and its au-
thorization.  
18 As regards the action of the current Minister, see above (n 9) and the corre-
sponding text. The Code of Conduct, adopted on 31 July 2017, whose official name is 
Codice di condotta per le ONG impegnate nelle operazioni di salvataggio dei migranti in 
mare, is available in Italian at the website of the Italian Ministry of Interior. For the sake 
of precision, I underline that the limitation of the action of NGOs in the Mediterranean 
Sea is to some extent an indirect effect and not a stated objective of the Code of Con-
duct. For details on different problems arising from the Code of Conduct, see F Mussi, 
‘Sulla controversa natura giuridica del codice di condotta del Governo italiano relativo 
alle operazioni di salvataggio dei migranti in mare svolte da organizzazioni non governa-
tive’ (2017) 10 Osservatorio sulle fonti 3, 1-10, and F Ferri, ‘Il Codice di condotta per le 
ONG e i diritti dei migranti: fra diritto internazionale e politiche europee’ (2018) 12 
Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 1, 189-198. 
19 In particular, Italy chairs EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia (see the zoom-in 
‘EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia One Year After: An Effective Measure to Tack-
le Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Networks?’ edited by F De Vittor, F 
Mussi and published in this Journal in August 2016). The role of Italy in this operation 
has been very recently criticised by some of the other actors involved, eg Germany and 
the EU Commission. 
20 Suffice it to have a look at the comparative data periodically published on the 
website of the Italian Ministry of Interior, section ‘Dati e statistiche degli sbarchi e 
dell’accoglienza dei migranti’, confirmed by the ‘EU Regular Overviews on Migration-
Related Fundamental Rights Concerns’, available at the website of the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency. 
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3. International responsibility of Libya for the gross human rights viola-
tions against migrants therein halted and detained and the ambiguous 
role of Italy 
 
As already pointed out in the introduction, migrants halted and de-
tained in Libya suffer from gross human rights violations. It is not diffi-
cult to prove that Libya is internationally responsible for that.  
Firstly, the human rights violations perpetrated against migrants in 
Libya are to be attributed to Libya. Indeed, said violations are commit-
ted by members of the coast guard and border guard and by the DCIM 
personnel, namely Libyan state organs that operate on behalf of Libya. 
Even if one assumed that these organs act ultra vires whenever they vio-
late the human rights of migrants, Libya would be internationally re-
sponsible anyway, since the norm codified in Article 7 DARSIWA would 
apply. 
Secondly, Libya complies with neither the customary international 
norm generally prohibiting gross human rights violations nor those pro-
tecting specific human rights, such as the right not to be enslaved and 
the right not to be tortured. Libyan authorities also violate some human 
rights conventions that the former Libyan Government ratified and that 
are still binding on Libya notwithstanding the regime change which oc-
curred during the Arab Spring.21 
Italy refuses to take any responsibility for the gross human rights vi-
olations inflicted on migrants in Libya. In the opinion of the Italian 
Government, such violations do not take place under Italian jurisdic-
tion or as a consequence of any Italian decision to push migrants back 
to Libya. Italian authorities emphasise that Libyan state organs halt ir-
regular migrants, bring them into the Libyan reception centres and 
maybe violate their human rights. In any case, they argue that Libya is 
entitled to prohibit irregular migrants from freely circulating in its terri-
 
21 See the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (as amended in 
1952 under the auspices of the UN); the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; the 1984 UN Conven-
tion against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children; the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights. The applicability of said 
treaties to Libya, notwithstanding the regime change after the Arab Spring, is explained 
by C Focarelli, Trattato di diritto internazionale (UTET 2015) 425-431.  
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tory due to the unlawfulness of their entrance and presence in the 
Country. As specifically regards the strategy of outsourcing border con-
trol to Libya, Italy denies that such a strategy supports Libyan authori-
ties that perpetrate atrocities against migrants. On the contrary, Italy 
stresses that the main instrument of this strategy, namely the 2017 MoU, 
contributes to strengthening the protection of the human rights of mi-
grants in Libya, since under Article 5 Libya commits to respecting any 
international obligation on the protection of human rights.22 
Although, at a first glance, the Italian arguments seem plausible, one 
also has to consider the critical reports that several international institu-
tions, NGOs, and newspapers have recently published concerning the 
Italian migration policies. Such reports aim at denouncing the aid and 
assistance with which Italy supplies Libya in order to implement its 
strategy of outsourcing border control. In some documents, it is clearly 
argued that Italy is internationally responsible, as this strategy contrib-
utes to the human rights violations that Libya perpetrates to the detri-
ment of migrants.23 
 
22 As for the position of the former Italian Government, see ‘Italian Minister De-
fends Method That Led to 87% Drop in Migrants from Libya’ The Guardian (7 Sep-
tember 2017); ‘Italy’s Libyan Vision Pays off as Migrant Flows Drop’ Politico (8 Octo-
ber 2017). Even if the current Italian Government lets the media pay attention mainly to 
its policy of preventing NGO vessels from disembarking shipwrecked migrants on Ital-
ian shores, it concretely shares the position of the former Government and continues 
with the outsourcing partnership with Libya. See ‘In the Hands of the Libyan Coast 
Guard: Pushback by Proxy’ Open Migration (28 June 2018); ‘Salvini e Di Maio corteg-
giano l’uomo forte di Tripoli’ Huffington Post (5 July 2018); ‘Fewer Migrants Are Mak-
ing It to Europe. Here’s Why’ Washington Post (23 July 2018). 
23 For instance, see the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established 
by the UN Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) UN Doc S/2017/466 (1 
June 2017); the Letter by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Eu-
rope to the Italian Ministry of Interior, CommHR/INM/sf0345-2017 (28 September 
2017); the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘UN Human 
Rights Chief: Suffering of Migrants in Libya Outrage to Conscience of Humanity’ (14 
November 2017); the Fifteenth Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC on Libya (9 May 
2018). Furthermore, see significantly Oxfam, ‘You Aren’t Human Any More’ (9 August 
2017); Doctors without Borders, ‘Libya: Open Letter – European Governments Are 
Feeding the Business of Suffering’ (6 September 2017); Amnesty International, ‘Libya’s 
Dark Web of Collusion’ (11 December 2017); Human Rights Watch (n 13). Then, see 
‘Perché l’accordo tra Italia e Libia sui migranti è sotto accusa’ Internazionale (29 No-
vember 2017); ‘Giochi pericolosi: delocalizzare in Africa le frontiere UE’ Left (7 August 
2018). 
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In wider terms, in the view of the destination Country, the strategy 
of outsourcing border control does not seem in itself to conflict with in-
ternational law, at least when it is implemented in cooperation with a 
‘safe’ transit Country.24 The concept of ‘safe’ transit Country is legally 
controversial.25 However, according to the majority view in literature, a 
Country can be considered ‘safe’ if it examines asylum claims, does not 
violate the obligation of non-refoulement and respects the human rights 
of migrants.26 Without any doubt, Libya is not a ‘safe’ transit Country, 
since it does not comply with the abovementioned requirements. As al-
ready said, migrants who are halted in Libya suffer from human rights 
violations committed by public organs. In addition, Libya does not rec-
ognise any right to asylum claim and is not a party to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refugee. Moreover, Libya qualifies irregular 
entrance into its territory as a crime to be punished with imprison-
ment.27 In its Hirsi judgment, while declaring the responsibility of Italy 
inter alia for the breach of the obligation of non-refoulement, the EC-
tHR expressly stated that Libya is not a ‘safe’ Country.28 
As a matter of fact, when Italy aids and assists Libya with the aim of 
implementing its strategy of outsourcing border control, it is cooperat-
ing in the migration field with a transit Country that is not ‘safe’. That 
seemingly entails the complicity of Italy with the Libyan authorities that 
 
24 See F De Vittor, ‘Il diritto di traversare il Mediterraneo … o quantomeno di pro-
varci’ (2014) 8 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 76-80.  
25 The adoption of a Regulation providing more accurate criteria to define the con-
cept of ‘safe third Country’ is currently under debate among EU Member States: see 
arts 36 and 45, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Common Procedure for International Protection in the Union and Repeal-
ing Directive 2013/32/EU, COM(2016) 467 final (13 July 2016). Interestingly, according 
to the French Conseil d’État, opinion of 16 May 2018, available at <www.gisti.org>, the 
Regulation would be inconsistent with the French Constitution. 
26 See M Hunt, ‘The Safe Country of Origin Concept in European Asylum Law. 
Past, Present and Future’ (2014) 26 Intl J Refugee Law 500-535; MT Gil-Bazo, ‘The 
Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection. Asses-
sing State Practice’ (2015) 33 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 42-77; G Cella-
mare, ‘In tema di Paese “sicuro” nel Sistema europeo di asilo’, in E Triggiani, F Cheru-
bini, I Ingravallo, E Nalin, R Virzo (eds), Dialoghi con Ugo Villani vol I (Cacucci 2017) 
417-424.  
27 See Decree no 247/1989, Executive Regulation of Law no. 6/1987 on Organising 
the Entry, Residence, and Exit of Foreigners in Libya.  
28 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (n 8) paras 97-138.  
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violate the human rights of migrants.29 In order to clarify from a legal 
viewpoint the role and the possible international responsibility of Italy 




4. Notion of State Responsibility for complicity in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act 
 
In many domestic orders, criminal law defines complicity as a form 
of participation or involvement in the crime of others. As a matter of 
principle, the act of the person abetting the crime does not amount to a 
crime itself. This act entails criminal consequences only inasmuch as it 
is linked to the crime of others.30 A similar rationale is at the basis of the 
international norm concerning State responsibility for complicity.31 A 
State is internationally responsible for complicity when it carries out an 
act that, albeit lawful, represents a form of aid or assistance in the com-
mission of a wrongful act by another State. Such rationale shapes interna-
tional responsibility for complicity as ‘derivative’ or ‘ancillary’, since that 
depends on the ‘main’ or ‘direct’ international responsibility.32 
 
29 A similar perspective was suggested by T Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Externalisa-
tion of European Migration Control and the Reach of International Refugee Law’, in E 
Guild, P Minderhoud (eds), The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law (Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 291-297, taking the cue from the 2008 Trattato di amicizia, 
partenariato e cooperazione tra Italia e Libia (also known as Benghazi Treaty), which 
now constitutes the basis of the 2017 MoU according to the preamble of the latter. 
30 See for instance J Gardner, ‘Complicity and Causality’ (2007) 1 Criminal L and 
Philosophy 127-141. 
31 DARSIWA (n 2), Introductory Comment to Chapter Four, 64-65. On interna-
tional responsibility for complicity, see extensively HP Aust, Complicity and the Law of 
State Responsibility (CUP 2011); M Jackson, Complicity in International Law (OUP 
2015); V Lanovoy, Complicity and Its Limits in the Law of International Responsibility 
(Hart Publishing 2016); G Puma, Complicità di Stati nell’illecito internazionale 
(Giappichelli 2018). For further elaboration, see E de Wet, ‘Complicity in the Viola-
tions of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Incumbent Governments through 
Direct Military Assistance on Request’ (2018) 67 ICLQ 287-313.  
32 See C Dominicé, ‘Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States and the Implication 
of a State in the Act of Another State’ in J Crawford, A Pellet, S Olleson (eds), The Law 
of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 281-289; V Lanovoy, ‘Complicity in an In-
ternational Wrongful Act’ in A Nollkaemper, I Plakokefalos (n 5) 134-168.  
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The ILC has included the international norm on State responsibility 
for complicity in Article 16 DARSIWA.33 Pursuant to this provision, ‘a 
State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an inter-
nationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances 
of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be interna-
tionally wrongful if committed by that State’. According to the ILC, Ar-
ticle 16 would apply for instance in the case of a State that makes its 
military bases available to another State to prepare airstrikes against a 
third State in breach of international law.34 By the same token, Article 
16 would be relevant when the territorial State supports the foreign 
State agents abducting a third State citizen, as usually happens in the 
practice of extraordinary renditions.35 In these examples, the State 
providing the military bases and the territorial State would both be re-
sponsible for complicity in the wrongful acts of other States. Such re-
sponsibility can arise for any kind of aid or assistance (commercial, fi-
nancial, logistic, military or political), even when granted by means of 
treaties concluded to support the wrongdoer.36 Instead, it is not clear 
whether a State is responsible for complicity when its aid or assistance 
depend on an omission.37 
Article 16 finds its roots in a draft provision submitted for the first time 
in the seventh report of Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago with the ambition 
 
33 Art 16 is included in DARSIWA, Part One, Chapter Four (articles 16-19), con-
cerning the responsibility of a State in connection with the wrongful acts of another 
State. Arts 17 and 18 deal with the responsibility of a State respectively for direction 
and control and for coercion exercised over the State that commits an internationally 
wrongful act. These articles do not apply prima facie to the case here under examina-
tion. Art 19 states that Chapter Four is without prejudice to international responsibility 
under other DARSIWA provisions.  
34 DARSIWA (n 2) Comment to art 16, 66-67 para 8.  
35 This example is drawn from P Pustorino, ‘Responsabilità internazionale degli 
Stati’, Enciclopedia del diritto – Annali VII (2014) 915. Also see El-Masri v Former Yugo-
slavian Republic of Macedonia App no 39630/09 (ECtHR, 13 December 2012) para 97 
et passim, and Nasr et Ghali c Italie App no 44883/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2016) para 
185 et passim. 
36 See B Graefrath, ‘Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility’ (1996) 
29 Revue belge de droit international 374. 
37 But see AAD Brown, ‘To Complicity… and Beyond! Passive Assistance and Pos-
itive Obligations in International Law’ (2016) 27 Hague YB Intl L, 133-152: this author 
tries to show that State responsibility for complicity depends not only on omissions, but 
also on passive assistance, namely assistance given unknowingly.  
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to apply the concept of ‘complicity’, as borrowed from domestic criminal 
law, in international law.38 Although Ago suggested this draft provision on-
ly as an encouragement to the progressive development of a correspondent 
customary norm,39 some doubts arose during the debate in the ILC with 
regard to the possibility of properly including the concept of ‘complicity’ in 
international law.40 Eventually, instead of the word ‘complicity’, the ILC 
preferred the locution ‘aid or assistance’,41 which Special Rapporteur James 
Crawford confirmed in 2001 in final Article 16 DARSIWA.42 
 
38 R Ago, ‘Seventh Report on State Responsibility’ (1978) YB Intl L Commission, 
vol I, 53-60. Art 16 corresponds to the then draft art 25, entitled ‘Complicity of a State 
in the Internationally Wrongful Act of Another State’. 
39 R Ago (n 38) 56. 
40 As already outlined, the concept of ‘complicity’ belongs to domestic criminal law 
and is not a term of art in public international law. It might be used in its original mean-
ing in criminal international law but – notwithstanding its inspirational rationale – it 
cannot fully describe a relationship among States in the law of international responsibil-
ity. This is the reason why eventually the ILC preferred using the locution ‘aid or assis-
tance’ in art 16. In any case, above all for reasons of fluency, scholars usually speak 
about ‘international responsibility for complicity’ instead of ‘international responsibility 
for aiding and assisting’. For further explanations, see HP Aust (n 31) 9-10; A Bufalini, 
‘La responsabilità internazionale dello Stato per atti di genocidio: un regime in cerca di 
autonomia’ (2015) 9 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 574-579; G Puma (n 31) 14-
16. 
41 (1978) YB Intl L Commission, vol II, 98-105. At first glance, the locution ‘aid or 
assistance’ seems to indicate two different links between the States involved, one (aid) 
stronger than the other (assistance). Yet, it is not clear if there is any real difference. No 
explanation is found in the ILC travaux préparatoires or in State positions before the 
ILC, the only exception being the uncertainties of the UK: see (2001), ‘State Responsi-
bility. Comments and Observations Received from Governments’ UN Doc 
A/CN.4/515, 52. The same locution is used in art 41(2) DARSIWA without any clear 
explanation, too.  
42 J Crawford, ‘Second Report on State Responsibility’ (1999) YB Intl L Commis-
sion, vol II, 49-54. For a historical approach to art 16, see N Schrijver, ‘Regarding 
“Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility” from Bernard Graefrath (1996-
II): The Evolution of Complicity in International Law (2015) 48 Revue belge de droit 
international 444-451. It is noteworthy that, even after the final adoption of DARSIWA 
in 2001, art 16 continues drawing criticism. In particular, in the view of some scholars, 
art 16 would describe situations already regulated in international law by primary rules. 
They argue that the notions of ‘due diligence’, ‘good faith’, or ‘reasonableness’ are al-
most always capable of explaining the precedents contemplated from the standpoint of 
complicity. See O Corten, ‘La “complicité” dans le droit de la responsabilité internatio-
nale: un concept inutile?’ (2011) 57 Annuaire français de droit international 57-84; O 
Corten, P Klein, ‘The Limits of Complicity as a Ground for Responsibility: Lessons 
Learned from the Corfu Channel Case’ in K Bannelier, T Christakis, S Heathcote (eds), 
The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law (Routledge 2011) 314-
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Despite the abovementioned initial idea of Special Rapporteur Rob-
erto Ago, it seems that the norm in Article 16 is nowadays gaining a cus-
tomary status.43 It is true that few States had expressed this belief before 
the ILC, and that the ILC therefore decided not to adopt a clear posi-
tion on this point.44 Nevertheless, subsequently, in its Genocide judg-
ment, the ICJ declared that the provision enshrined in Article 16 corre-
sponds to a customary international norm.45  
Although limited, the current State practice reflects the ICJ posi-
tion. The customary character of the norm on State responsibility for 
complicity has been quoted by the Mucyo Commission, instituted by 
the Rwandan Parliament to investigate the alleged international respon-
sibility of France in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.46 Moreover, some 
States (Austria, Turkey, UK, US) have alluded to the customary status 
of the norm codified in Article 16 to suggest that other States (first of 
all, Iran and Russia) supporting the combatants in the ongoing Syrian 
conflict are internationally responsible for complicity in the violations of 
humanitarian international law committed in that context.47 In the end, 
it is also worth noting that the German Bundesverfassungsgericht had 
 
text, also see A Seibert-Fohr, ‘From Complicity to Due Diligence: When Do States In-
cur Responsibility for Their Involvement in Serious International Wrongdoing?’ (2018) 
60 German YB Intl L (forthcoming) available at <www.ssrn.com> 8-19. In addition, 
with specific regard to the case here under discussion, see the suggested application of 
the doctrine of positive obligations: A Liguori (n 4) 1228-1237. 
43 Many scholars currently share the opinion that the norm in art 16 DARSIWA has 
already acquired a customary status. See HP Aust (n 31) Chapter Four. Also see G 
Nolte, HP Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers – Complicit States, Mixed Messages, and Interna-
tional Law’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 1, 7-10; V Lanovoy (n 32) 135; M Jackson (n 31) 147-173; 
G Puma (n 31) 29-59; E de Wet (n 31) 289-290. 
44 DARSIWA (n 2), Comment to art 16, 66 para 2. The list of States that admit-
ted before the ILC the customary nature of the norm being codified in art 16 can be 
read in HP Aust (n 31) 173-174. 
45 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] 
ICJ Rep 43 paras 419-420.  
46 Commission nationale indépendante chargée de rassembler les éléments de 
prévue montrant l’implication de l’État français dans la préparation et l’exécution du 
génocide perpétré au Rwanda en 1994, Rapport conclusif (5 August 2008) available 
only in French at <www.lanuitrwandaise.org>. 
47 Austria: ‘Austrian Position on Arms Embargo in Syria’ The Guardian (15 May 
2013); Turkey: ‘Turkey Accuses Russia of Supplying Syria with Munitions’ The 
Guardian (11 October 2012); UK and US: UN Doc S/PV.7777 (25 September 2016) 
5-9. Also see E de Wet (n 31) 294-295. 
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5. Elements of State Responsibility for complicity in the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act 
 
The connection between the lawful act of the assisting State and the 
wrongful act of the assisted State is the first and preliminary element of 
the international responsibility for complicity. The lawful act of the as-
sisting State is to be intended as a ‘significant facilitation’ in the com-
mission by the assisted State of the wrongful act. Should the assistance 
be essential to implement the wrongful act, the assisting State would be 
directly responsible, as would the assisted State. The ILC highlights this 
point.49 
The opposability of the breached international obligation is the se-
cond element of State responsibility for complicity. Article 16(b) pre-
cisely states that such form of responsibility will arise only if the assist-
ed State and the assisting State are both bound by the same interna-
tional norm the violation of which is ascertained.50 
The knowledge of supporting an international wrongful act is the 
third element of State responsibility for complicity. More to the point, 
under Article 16(a), this kind of responsibility can be invoked only if it 
is proved that the assisting State has knowingly facilitated the assisted 
 
48Al-M (5 November 2003) 2 BVerfGE 1506/3 [47]. The official English translation 
can be found at the website of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. For comments on 
this case, see A Nollkaemper, ‘Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts’ 
(2007) 101 AJIL 780; M Jackson (n 31) 151; E de Wet (n 31) 4. 
49 See DARSIWA (n 2), Comment to art 16, 66 para 5. Also see the even more ac-
curate declaration of ILC Member N Ushakov (1978) YB Intl L Commission, vol I, 239, 
para 11: ‘while participation must necessarily be of an active and direct character, 
[complicity] must not be too direct, because then the participant […] becomes a co-
author of the offence, and that goes beyond complicity’. 
50 The element of opposability draws criticism. Some authors argue that it does not 
belong to the customary international norm on State responsibility for complicity and 
that its inclusion in art 16 could work as a safety clause to the benefit of the complicit 
State. For specifications, see extensively G Puma (n 31) 120-145. Also see the declara-
tion of ILC Member CP Economides, (1999) YB Intl L Commission, vol I, 68, para 5. 
Special Rapporteur James Crawford anyway confirmed this element, which he connect-
ed to the rule pacta tertiis neque nocent neque iuvant: J Crawford (n 42) 51.  
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State in its wrongdoing.51 The interpretation of Article 16(a) is not clear, 
since the degree of the required knowledge is not defined.52 In its Geno-
cide judgment, the ICJ interpreted this element as ‘full’ knowledge with 
the aim of determining whether a case of international complicity had 
occurred.53 However, Article 16 DARSIWA was not directly relevant to 
that case and was taken into account only for comparative purposes. 
Given that the ICJ was examining the assistance that a foreign State had 
allegedly granted to some individuals in order to perpetrate the interna-
tional crime of genocide, it assessed the element of knowledge with re-
gard to Article III(e) of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Genocide prohibiting complicity in genocide.54 Perhaps, in 
other cases, where a specific norm was not at stake, the element of 
knowledge could be proved even in the event that the assisting State 
should have reasonably known that its lawful act was facilitating the 
wrongful act of the assisted State. This interpretation would help avoid 
the very common situations of ‘wilful blindness’, that is to say the delib-
erate efforts by the assisting State to escape the clear knowledge of the 
international wrongfulness on the part of the assisted State. 
Eventually, in its comment to Article 16 the ILC lists intention 
among the elements determining international responsibility for com-
plicity. In order to apply Article 16, the ILC states that ‘the aid or assis-
tance must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of the 
wrongful act’, adding that ‘a State is not responsible for aid or assis-
tance under Article 16 unless the relevant State organ intended, by the 
 
51 According to A Seibert-Fohr (n 42) 3-8, 19-22, when a State contributes with-
out knowledge to violations of international law by another State, responsibility for 
participation in the wrongful acts arises anyway. It would be more a matter of inter-
national responsibility for violation of the obligation of due diligence than a matter of 
international responsibility for complicity. In other words, whereas due diligence is 
usually considered in terms of the obligation to take action in order to prevent others 
from committing wrongful acts, Seibert-Fohr argues that it is also applicable to indi-
rect forms of participation, such as contributions to a violation without knowledge. 
52 For instance, according to HP Aust (n 31) 235, art 16(a) requires a level of 
knowledge ‘approaching wrongful intent’. Instead, T Gammeltoft-Hansen, JC Hatha-
way, ‘Non-refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence’ (2014) 53 Columbia J 
Transnational L 280, suggest a broader reading of this element, interpreted as only re-
quiring a ‘constructive knowledge’ on the part of the assisting State. 
53 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (n 45) para 432. 
54 ibid paragrahs 419-420. 
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aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful con-
duct’.55 Nevertheless, there is no trace of the element of intention in the 
text of Article 16. In view of the discrepancy between the text of Article 
16 and the ILC comment to this same article, a problem emerges as to 
the alleged role of intention in international responsibility for complici-
ty.56 
The reference to the element of intention in the ILC comment to 
Article 16 but not in the text of Article 16 probably stems from a ‘com-
promise’. Indeed, looking at the travaux préparatoires of DARSIWA, 
one infers that States’ positions on this element diverged. For instance, 
while the representatives of the UK and the US argued that the element 
of intention had to be mentioned in the text of Article 16,57 Dutch dip-
lomats believed that the contiguous element of knowledge was 
enough.58 The agents of Denmark and South Korea promoted some in-
 
55 DARSIWA (n 2) Comment to art 16, 66 paras 3 and 5. Emphasis added. 
56 According to JB Quigley, ‘Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in 
the Law of State Responsibility’ (1986) 57 British YB Intl L 113, there is no real differ-
ence between intention and knowledge when speaking about State responsibility for 
complicity. In a very similar view, H Moynihan, ‘Aiding and Assisting: The Mental Ele-
ment under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Respon-
sibility’ (2018) 67 ICLQ 455-471, has recently claimed that the difference between these 
two elements is in practice more apparent than real. On the contrary, B Graefrath (n 
36) 378, argues that intention and knowledge are autonomous concepts both to be met 
in the event of State responsibility for complicity, the only exception being complicity in 
the commission of a wrongful act affecting the International Community as a whole, 
where intention does not matter since a stronger rule about complicity would work. A 
solution akin to the one just mentioned is that of HP Aust (n 31) 235-249, who ulti-
mately considers intention among the elements of State responsibility for complicity. 
Also see G Nolte and HP Aust (n 43) 16-18, who suggest that art 41(2) DARSIWA pro-
vides for separate obligations of non-assistance and non-recognition when a ius cogens 
norm is at stake. According to Nolte and Aust, intention is not required in art 41(2), in 
contrast to art 16, since a stronger rule about complicity is needed as far as serious 
breaches of peremptory norms of general international law are concerned. For further 
discussion on art 41(2) see section 7 of this paper. Albeit with reference to the specific 
case of complicity in genocide, P Palchetti, ‘State Responsibility for Complicity in Gen-
ocide’ in P Gaeta (ed), The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary (OUP 2009) 
389, believes that the sentence ‘with the view to facilitating’ in the ILC Comment to art 
16 indicates the deliberate nature of the assistance given. For a critical and updated 
analysis of other doctrinal positions on the element of intention, see G Puma (n 31) 101-
120, in whose opinion intention is not among the elements of State responsibility for 
complicity. 
57 (1998) YB Intl L Commission, vol II, pt 1, 129. 
58 (2001) YB Intl L Commission, vol II, pt 1, 52. 
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termediate solutions,59 one of which was the abovementioned ‘compro-
mise’ ultimately adopted.  
In a nutshell, it seems that the customary international norm on 
State responsibility for complicity does not include the element of in-
tention. In its Genocide judgment, the ICJ declared that the text of Ar-
ticle 16 as such corresponds to a customary international norm, without 
mentioning the element of intention.60 Furthermore, the following Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (DARIO) do 
not consider the element of intention as regards the responsibility of in-
ternational organisations for complicity.61 What is more, as a former 
ILC member underlines, when discrepancies arise between Draft Arti-
cles and the relevant Commentaries in the context of the ILC works, 
greater attention should be paid to the former.62 
 
 
6. Yes, Italy is internationally responsible for complicity with Libya in 
the perpetration of gross human rights violations against migrants… 
 
Bearing in mind the Italian strategy of outsourcing border control to 
Libya in order to hinder the migration flows in the Central Mediterra-
nean Sea,63 it is now possible to demonstrate that Italy is internationally 
responsible for complicity with Libya in the perpetration of gross hu-
 
59 ibid. Denmark advanced its position on behalf of the group of Scandinavian 
States.  
60 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (n 45) paras 419-420. 
61 Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations, with Commen-
taries, UN Doc A/66/10 (2011). Art 14 deals with the responsibility of international or-
ganisations for complicity in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by a 
State or by another international organisation, while art 58 governs the situation of State 
responsibility for complicity in the perpetration of an internationally wrongful act by an 
international organisation. With regard to these two articles, Special Rapporteur Gior-
gio Gaja acknowledged how discordant the positions about the element of intention 
were. Thus, he chose not to focus on the topic. See G Gaja, ‘Eighth Report on Respon-
sibility of International Organisations’ (2011) YB Intl L Commission, vol II, pt 1, 95-96, 
paras 45-49. 
62 See G Gaja, ‘Interpreting Articles Adopted by the International Law Commis-
sion’ (2014) 85 British YB Intl L 10-20. 
63 See above, mainly sections 2 and 3. 
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man rights violations against the migrants therein halted and detained.64 
All the elements listed in Article 16 occur in this case. 
Firstly, there is a connection between the conduct of Italy and the 
wrongdoing of Libya. More precisely, Italian authorities cooperate with 
the Libyan coast guard and border guard by sending them equipment, 
funding, trainers. It is then the Libyan coast guard and border guard that 
usually intercept migrants and violate their human rights. Furthermore, 
the building and the administration of the Libyan reception centres, as 
well as the training and payment of the personnel therein employed rely 
for the most part on resources coming from Italy. As a matter of fact, mi-
grants are very often confined in these centres, which are actually intern-
ment camps. In these ways, Italy obtains that migrants wishing to set sail 
towards European shores are held in Libya, consistently with its strategy 
of outsourcing border control. However, at the same time, by way of its 
aid and assistance, Italy also significantly abets the Libyan state organs 
(namely the coast guard, the border guard, and the DCIM personnel) 
that inflict gross human rights violations on migrants.  
Secondly, the element of opposability is also proved: the conduct of 
Libya entails the violation of customary and conventional international 
norms binding Italy too. Of course, both Italy and Libya are bound by 
the customary international norms prohibiting gross human rights viola-
tions and banning slavery and torture. Moreover, both States are parties 
at least to the following treaties: the 1926 Convention to Suppress the 
Slave Trade and Slavery (as amended in 1952); the 1966 UN Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; the 1984 UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 
 
64 As sketched out above, section 2, Italy implements its strategy of outsourcing 
border control to Libya in concert with EU migration policies. The EU legal position is 
not assessed here, although the EU too is seemingly responsible for aiding and assisting 
Libya in the commission of human rights violations against migrants. In addition to the 
bibliography already cited above (n 13), see N Markard, ‘The Right to Leave by Sea: 
Legal Limits on EU Migration Control by Third Countries’ (2016) 27 Eur J Intl L 591-
616; F De Vittor (n 4) 5-27; R Palladino, ‘Nuovo quadro di partenariato dell’Unione 
europea per la migrazione e profili di responsabilità dell’Italia (e dell’Unione europea) 
in riferimento al caso libico’ (2018) 2 Freedom, Security & Justice: European L Studies 
124-128; G Pascale (n 10) 438-440; A Skordas, ‘A “Blind Spot” in the Migration De-
bate? International Responsibility of the EU and Its Member States for Cooperating 
with the Libyan Coast Guard and Militias’ (2018) EU Immigration and Asylum L and 
Policy <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/>; V Moreno-Lax, MG Giuffré (n 3) 19-25. 
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2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Es-
pecially Women and Children.  
Thirdly, Italy acts with knowledge of the circumstances while aid-
ing and assisting Libya to stop migrants and to lead them into the Lib-
yan reception centres with the aim of implementing its strategy of out-
sourcing border control to Libya. In a nutshell, Italy is aware of abet-
ting Libya in the perpetration of gross human rights violations against 
migrants. After all, Italy has known that Libya is not a ‘safe’ transit 
Country since at least the date when the ECtHR delivered its Hirsi 
judgment.65 Furthermore, in addition to the frequent and numerous 
journalistic inquiries, NGO reports, and documents of international 
organisations, even an Italian domestic court has recently ascertained 
that the DCIM personnel of the Libyan reception centres usually tor-
ture and enslave the migrants hosted there.66 
Finally, there is no need to demonstrate the intention of Italy to fa-
cilitate Libya in the commission of atrocities against migrants.67 As ar-
gued in the previous section, intention is not among the elements to be 
proved in order to determine the State responsibility for complicity. 
 
 
7. …and yes, Italy is also internationally responsible for aiding and as-
sisting Libya in maintaining the situation resultantly created and for 
recognising that situation 
 
In the frame of DARSIWA, in addition to Article 16, Article 41(2) is 
also relevant in order to answer the question of whether Italy is some-
 
65 See above, final part of section 3. In his concurring opinion to the Hirsi judge-
ment, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque not only confirmed the responsibility of Italy in the 
frame of the ECHR, but also made reference to the possibility of an ‘additional’ interna-
tional responsibility of Italy for complicity with Libya in the commission of gross human 
rights violations against the migrants pushed back to Libya. See Hirsi Jamaa and Others 
v Italy (n 8) Concurring Opinion of Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, 12-13. 
66 Corte d’Assise di Milano, sentenza no 10/17 (10 October 2017) available in 
(2018) Diritto penale contemporaneo <www.penalecontemporaneo.it>, with a com-
ment by S Bernardi ‘Una condanna della Corte d’Assise di Milano svela gli orrori dei 
“centri di raccolta e transito” dei migranti in Libia’ 207-210. 
67 On the contrary, at least in this specific case, the element of intention should 
be proved or is someway proved according to F De Vittor (n 4) 26; R Palladino (n 64) 
127-128; A Skordas (n 64).  
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how internationally responsible for the perpetration of gross human 
rights violations against migrants in Libya. The Italian strategy of out-
sourcing border control to Libya to hinder migration flows in the Cen-
tral Mediterranean Sea not only entails that Italy is internationally re-
sponsible for complicity with Libya in the atrocities inflicted on mi-
grants. It could also imply that Italy is internationally responsible for 
aiding and assisting Libya in maintaining the situation resultantly creat-
ed and for recognising (at least implicitly) that situation as lawful.  
Article 41(2) precisely states that ‘no State shall recognise as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of Article 40, 
nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation’.68 A prelimi-
nary caveat applies. Article 41(2) does not deal with State responsibility 
for complicity and does not concern the ancillary role of a State in the 
commission by another State of a serious wrongful act.69 Article 41(2) 
just enumerates two obligations coming into consideration ‘after the 
 
68 Art 41 is part of DARSIWA, Part Two, Chapter Three, entitled to Serious 
Breaches of Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General International Law. Art 
41(1) enshrines the positive obligation of States to cooperate in order to bring to an end 
through lawful means any serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international 
law. Italy seemingly fulfils this (vague) obligation, being among the main sponsors of 
political and social stability in Libya. Art 41(3) underlines that the foregoing obligations 
are without prejudice to any other consequence of State responsibility included in 
DARSIWA Part Two or otherwise arising under international law. For insightful com-
ments on art 41, see A Gattini, ‘A Return Ticket to “Communitarisme”, Please’ (2002) 
13 Eur J Intl L 1185-1195; A Gianelli, ‘Le conseguenze delle gravi violazioni di obblighi 
posti da norme imperative tra norme primarie e norme secondarie’ in M Spinedi, A 
Gianelli, ML Alaimo (eds), La codificazione della responsabilità internazionale degli Stati 
alla prova dei fatti. Problemi e spunti di riflessione (Giuffré 2006) 273-289; MI Papa, 
‘Autodeterminazione dei popoli e Stati terzi’ in M Distefano (ed), Il principio di autode-
terminazione dei popoli alla prova del terzo millennio (Wolters Kluwer/CEDAM 2014) 
63-80. For specific comments on the two obligations of abstention in art 41(2), see M 
Dawidowicz, ‘The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful Situation’ in J Craw-
ford, A Pellet, S Olleson (n 32) 677-686, and NHB Jørgensen, ‘The Obligation of Non-
Assistance to the Responsible State’ in J Crawford, A Pellet, S Olleson (n 32) 687-693. 
Jørgensen also examines the legal history of art 41(2) in the ILC long drafting process. 
69 Some scholars argue that articles 16 and 41(2) both deal with State responsibility 
for complicity. According to them, while art 16 would concern complicity only in ‘ordi-
nary’ wrongful acts, art 41(2) would work as a sort of lex specialis focusing on complici-
ty in serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general interna-
tional law. See G Nolte, HP Aust (n 43) 16-18; HP Aust (n 31) 326, 336-338; V Lano-
voy (n 31) 106-109.  
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fact’,70 namely after a serious wrongful act has been committed and 
when a new situation prevails. The inclusion of this provision in 
DARSIWA Part Two, focusing on the content of State responsibility, 
confirms said interpretation. Hence, Article 16 is the only DARSIWA 
provision on State responsibility for complicity, to be applied regardless 
of the ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ nature of a wrongful act.71 
The occurrence of a ‘serious breach within the meaning of Article 
40’ is the prerequisite for the application of Article 41(2). Pursuant to 
Article 40, a breach is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure 
by the responsible State to fulfil an obligation72. It is furthermore widely 
known that Article 40 deals with (breaches of) obligations arising under 
peremptory norms of general international law.73 
In the case here under discussion, it is almost self-evident that Libya 
is committing a serious breach within the meaning of Article 40. First 
and foremost, the breach by Libya of its international obligations is se-
rious inasmuch it is both gross (Libya performs human rights violations 
of a flagrant nature and with intensive and prolonged effects) and sys-
tematic (it relies on a large-scale and generalised practice, meets a con-
solidated scheme and consists of actions against targeted persons)74. 
Secondly, suffice it to point out that Libya is failing to fulfil the obliga-
tion not to commit gross human rights violations that clearly arises un-
der a peremptory norm of general international law.75 Hence, Article 
41(2) applies in this case. 
 
70 DARSIWA (n 2) Comment to art 41, 115 para 11.  
71 For in-depth discussion on the different functions of articles 16 and 41(2), see G 
Puma (n 31) 147-166. For a comparative analysis of articles 16 and 41(2), see A Gattini 
(n 68) 1191-1192, who highlights some coordination problems between the two provi-
sions.  
72 On the notion of ‘serious breach’ in art 40, see DARSIWA (n 2), Comment to art 
40, 113, paras 7-8. Also see A Gianelli (n 68) 247-248, 252-255. 
73 It is known that the expression ‘obligations arising under peremptory norms of 
general international law’, standing for ius cogens, has replaced the previous one 
‘obligations owed to the international community as a whole’, referring to obligations 
erga omnes. This replacement draws strong criticism according to P Picone, ‘Obblighi 
erga omnes e codificazione della responsabilità degli Stati’ (2005) 88 Rivista di diritto 
internazionale 938-943. 
74 Suffice it to bear in mind the information given above, sections 1 and 3, and the 
many reports issued by international organisations, NGOs, and newspapers. 
75 It might be submitted that the customary international norms prohibiting slav-
ery and torture have also, to a certain extent, a peremptory status. In any case, the 
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 This provision encompasses two obligations of abstention binding 
all States. In its comment to Article 41(2), the ILC highlights that the 
obligation of collective non-recognition of a situation arising from a se-
rious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law refers 
both to formal recognition and to any act implying a de facto recogni-
tion.76 With regard to the prohibition of rendering aid and assistance in 
maintaining such a situation, after comparing the notion of ‘aid and as-
sistance’ in Article 41(2) with the similar one in Article 16, the ILC 
makes it clear that Article 41(2) takes for granted the scrutiny of the el-
ements of opposability and knowledge, the demonstration of which is 
instead required by Article 16.77 According to the ILC, the two obliga-
tions of abstention enshrined in Article 41(2) would also stem from cus-
tomary international law.78 The ICJ has seemingly confirmed this idea in 
its 2004 advisory opinion on the Wall in the Palestinian Territory.79 
Italy does not abide by Article 41(2) in the context of the serious 
breach by Libya of the obligation not to commit gross human rights vio-
lations. It is here submitted that the same factual circumstances dis-
cussed above to illustrate the complicity of Italy with Libya in perpetrat-
ing gross human rights violations against migrants can be now taken in-
 
peremptory norm prohibiting gross human rights violations encompasses them. On 
this topic, see LF Damrosch, ‘Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations’ (2011) 
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law.  
76 DARSIWA (n 2), Comment to art 41, 114-115 paras 4-10. 
77 ibid paras 11-12. In particular, with regard to the element of knowledge, the ILC 
underlines that it would be inconceivable that a State had no news of a serious breach 
perpetrated by another State. 
78 ibid paras 6-8 and 12, where the ILC gives proof of the international practice 
surrounding both the obligation of non-recognition and the prohibition of rendering 
aid and assistance in cases of serious breaches within the meaning of art 40.  
79 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 paras 155-160. In particular, in para 
159, the ICJ writes that ‘[g]iven the character and the importance of the rights and ob-
ligations involved, [...] all States are under an obligation not to recognise the illegal situ-
ation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render 
aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction’. The word-
ing and meaning of para 159 seem to indicate the tendency of the ICJ to support the 
customary nature of the obligations in art 41(2), even if a direct reference to this provi-
sion lacks. Express references to art 41(2) are found in the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Pieter Kooijmans [2004] ICJ Rep 231 paras 40-49. Also see A Gattini (n 68) 1189; A 
Gianelli (n 68) 275; NHB Jørgensen (n 68) 691-692. 
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to account again to demonstrate that Italy is also aiding and assisting 
Libya in maintaining the situation thus created.80 Should Italy not pro-
vide aid and assistance to Libya also in order to maintain that situation, 
its strategy of outsourcing border control to Libya to counter migration 
flows in the Central Mediterranean Sea would not achieve successful 
outcomes. It goes without saying that, while aiding and assisting Libya 
in maintaining that situation, Italy de facto recognises that same situa-
tion as lawful.81 In short, the conduct proving that Italy is international-
ly responsible pursuant to Article 16 unsurprisingly makes it possible to 





80 It could be objected that the serious breach by Libya of the obligation not to 
commit gross human rights violations has a continuous character. In this case, the aid 
and assistance given by Italy would have a continuous character too and would not pre-
cisely concern the maintaining of a situation already created. Nevertheless, the ILC 
makes it clear that the continuous character of a serious breach does not matter in order 
to apply art 41(2): see DARSIWA (n 2), Comment to art 41, 115 para 11. 
81 ibid para 12, from where it is possible to infer this conclusion inasmuch as the 
ILC states that the obligation not to render aid and assistance in maintaining a situation 
stemming from a serious breach within the meaning of art 40 is ‘a logical extension’ of 
the obligation not to recognise that situation: these two obligations are intertwined. It is 
true that, with regard to non-territorial situations, the meaning of the obligation of non-
recognition is not immediately clear. It is also true that in the scholarly debate and 
seemingly in State practice, non-recognition is essentially thought of for the territorial 
effects of a serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law (see for 
instance MI Papa (n 68) 66-71). However, the fact alone that the State practice on the 
application of the obligation of non-recognition that is usually quoted concerns territo-
rial situations does not necessarily negate that this obligation may also cover non-
territorial situations: what seems decisive is not the ‘territorial element’ but that the un-
lawful situation flowing from a serious breach of a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law leads to a legal claim by the wrongdoing State which is capable of being de-
nied by other States (see more accurately M Dawidowicz (n 68) 683-684). 
